Caesar (I)

Today is the Ides of March. On this day, over two-thousand years ago (2,059 in the Gregorian calendar, to be precise), the greatest civilization of the ancient world would see its once-invincible Republic rapidly spiral towards a major shift in its political structure with the assassination of Rome's greatest historical figure: Gaius Julius Caesar. His death was not solely responsible for the demise of the Roman Republic, but it did serve as a spark to a powder keg of social and political dysfunction. In this light, the study of Caesar is not merely an appreciation for a highly talented individual, but an examination of a man who perhaps solely represented the changing social dynamics in the shadows of Roman society.

My fascination with Caesar has been fairly recent, though I recall taking mild interest in high school as well. At that time, I was inclined to believe what students are largely taught about him, not through the eyes of serious, historical examination, but through artists like Shakespeare who conjure up the image of a mad tyrant who can only be tamed by the actions of just and noble senators, saviors of the glorious Republic. However, if one looks beyond mainstream exposure, the study of Caesar reveals a great deal more and both historical and modern scholars have been deeply divided as to his intentions and the purpose he served in Rome's evolution towards empire.

I admit having been solidified as a great admirer of Caesar. Psychologically speaking, this makes a lot of sense, considering my fondness for exposing (or at least seeking to expose) weaknesses in traditional lines of thought. Caesar was certainly a revolutionary in this respect, challenging the aristocracy of the decaying Roman Republic who had long been using the mask of democracy to sustain their acquired privilege and dominance over the majority of citizens. His actions represented a classic battle of democracy vs. autocracy and how one flourished when the other failed. In the modern world, where the appeal of democratic governments is unquestionable, examining these notions in a purely analytical light takes effort and perhaps it is for this reason that I have found the study of Caesar and the beginning of the Roman empire to be an immensely rewarding experience.

I do not intend for this post to be an authoritative biography (one is recommended to read Goldsworthy's "Caesar: Life of a Colossus")--that would be quite inappropriate. Rather, I wish to cast Caesar in a more favorable light and challenge misconceptions that have long obfuscated an accurate study of his rise to power and short-lived rule (though there are certain aspects that make this difficult, regardless). Caesar served Rome well; it may have cost him his life and the life of the Roman Republic, but the new government that would emerge under his great-nephew Octavian (Augustus) would survive well into the sixteenth century and continues to influence Western civilization to this day.

Unquestionably, this will be my longest post yet. I have divided this post into a series of three "volumes". Those primarily interested in my case regarding Caesar's rule should proceed to part III, though the background that I provide is, in many ways, central to my argument.

Caesar was born into favorable circumstances, the son of a patrician family (the high class of Roman society) and whose father achieved moderate success in public office, governing Asia minor before dying in 85 B.C. in Pisa. Caesar had a strong mother, Aurelia, who carefully supervised his education and when his father died, he became the head of household at sixteen. Indeed, Caesar enjoyed a privileged childhood, but by no means would this be indicative of success. What is more significant is the political environment of Rome during Caesar's childhood, a period fraught with internal conflict and contentious reform. Perhaps a chronology of events is required, for greater understanding.

In the earlier days of the Roman Republic, an office existed outside of the ordinary magistrate that afforded an individual the absolute authority (imperium) to deal with a time of emergency. This was the Roman dictator. Indeed, it must be shocking for modern readers to think of dictator as some sort of accepted office, but this was the original purpose. From about 500-200 B.C. there appears to have been an appointed dictator every two or three years, mostly for purposes involving war (of which Rome saw much) or administration during holidays. However, in 202 B.C, the office of dictator was apparently abolished and future emergency powers were granted to the two consuls (ordinarily the highest office in Rome) via senatorial decree.

Roughly seventy years later, the Roman Republic began to witness a strain on its functionality out of growing social discontent. Due to the lengthy period required of soldiers to serve in the military, many Roman farmers found their property confiscated and absorbed by the nobility because of lingering debts incurred during their service. As a result, many discharged veterans found themselves impoverished, flooding the streets of major cities as beggars. By contrast, the newly acquired property by the rich enhanced their fortunes and as a result, Roman society began to see a major gap in wealth distribution. A major incident occurred in 133 B.C, when a politician known as Tiberius Gracchus sought to initiate a major reform in order to deal with this situation. His proposed law, known as the Lex Sempronia Agraria, would limit the amount of conquered land (125 hectares) that could be acquired by a single citizen and any above this limit would be redistributed to poor veteran families and the homeless, allowing them to become eligible for taxation and military service (only property owners could join the army). In a sense, Gracchus was among the first "ancient socialists", who saw redistribution as a means of not only combating poverty, but mitigating the shrinking pool of citizens available for the military, exacerbated by the growing wealth of the aristocracy.

Not surprisingly, the nobility of the senate opposed his reform, fearing the confiscation of portions of their land. After several attempts, Gracchus attempted to circumvent traditional legislation through more unorthodox measures, such as having opponents voted out of office and expanding the use of tribunal powers (e.g. the veto). Matters eventually came to a head when a group of conservative senators accused Gracchus of seeking kingship and beat him to death with clubs, tossing his body into the Tiber river. The remainder of his supporters were hunted down and either exiled or killed. Interestingly, Gracchus' reforms succeeded in passing, partly in thanks to the efforts of his brother, Gaius Gracchus. Gaius was also a revolutionary, who expanded upon Tiberius' land reform and continued to pursue agendas that threatened the conservative nature of the senate. Most shocking was his attempt to extend Roman citizenship to the whole of Italy, angering not just the senate, but many Roman citizens as well. Gaius, too, suffered a terrible end, having his head severed and delivered to his political opponents.

In many ways, the Gracchi may be considered the fathers of populism and socialism in the Roman Republic. Their reforms challenged the long-held traditions of the Senate and threatened to marginalize the privileges of the aristocracy, a faction more interested in the promotion of their families and nobility, rather than the interests of the general citizenry. Reforms aside, the Grachii were perhaps most important for exposing the fact that the political climate of Rome was changing; conservatism was losing hegemony in the face of new demands from the populace and ambitious leaders within the senate had begun to use populist/socialist proposals to amass support against the nobility. The Republic was now in an era of strife between the populares (for the people) and the optimates (for the aristocracy).

This era was perhaps ushered in by a major conflict known as the Social War in 91 B.C. It began when the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus, following in the footsteps of the Grachii, attempted to grant citizenship to Rome's Italian allies. Unsurprisingly, he was publicly murdered at his home before his reform could be passed. This time, however, the people behind his proposal would not endure such an act of violence and several Italian states revolted in response. After a couple years of fighting, Rome eventually emerged victorious, but partially relented by granting citizenship to Italian communities who did not take part in the rebellion.

Caesar was only nine when the Social War broke out, but it did involve some of his older associates, such as Cicero, who would later be involved in his political affairs. More importantly, the Social War led to another internal conflict between two of Rome's esteemed military commanders, Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla, whose relationship quickly deteriorated after the rebellion was put down.  Marius was a highly ambitious general who had been elected consul an astonishing seven times during his career, though by the time the Social War broke out, he was sixty-six and took only an early role in the conflict. On the other hand, Sulla had achieved remarkable success and prestige during the Social War, earning the highest military honor, the Grass Crown. After the conflict, he was chosen by the senate to command legions in the East and wage war against Mithridates of Pontus.

Marius, however, resorted to questionable means by using a political ally to reverse the senate's decision, undoubtedly acting out of jealously towards Sulla's recent success. Command of the East was instead given to Marius, but Sulla refused to comply and responded in a historically unprecedented manner: he marched his legions upon Rome, an event never before recorded in Roman history. Marius was unable to respond fast enough and fled the city, with Sulla resuming the Eastern command after declaring Marius and his allies enemies of the state.

Sulla's victory would not last long. A loyal supporter of Marius, known as Cinna, assisted the refugee in gathering forces in northern Africa and expelled Sulla's supporters in Rome, successfully reclaiming the city. The two would take violent action by executing their enemies and displaying their heads in the Roman forum; Sulla's property was subsequently burned. Marius and Cinna would reclaim their positions as consul, but Marius died seventeen days later. In what followed is perhaps the most important series of events to influence Caesar's politics and will end our chronology.

Sulla concluded his victory against Mithridates and, upon hearing that Cinna had been killed in a mutiny, decided the time was right to retake Rome. Despite encountering several battles along the way, Sulla finally engaged his enemies on the outskirts of the city and was ultimately victorious. What followed was an unprecedented series of violence, perhaps among the most infamous chapters in all of Roman history. Sulla proscribed hundreds of opponents, executing at will and offering bounties to those who brought him the severed heads of the victims.

More importantly, Sulla revived the office of the dictatorship after nearly 140 years of dormancy. Unlike the usual six-month limit, Sulla insisted that he hold this position for as long as it took to "amend" the Senate, which allowed him to expand the members of the nobility (about 300) and initiate several constitutional reforms that strongly favored the aristocracy. Indeed, Sulla was an optimate who saw the rise of Marius as a dangerous byproduct of the populares and it is reasonable to consider Sulla's seizure of power as a powerful conservative backlash, in contrast to the visionary efforts of the Grachii. The dictatorship had been resurrected under Sulla's rule, though he himself would only hold it for just over a year's time before resigning it 80 B.C upon finalizing his reforms. Interestingly, Caesar would later criticize Sulla for his swift resignation of the post; while this could be attributed to scorn, he may have genuinely considered it an action of political weakness, considering that some of Sulla's reforms were simply undone in the following years.

In many ways, the rise of Caesar had been paved long before he embarked on his career. The intensifying conflict between the optimates and populares led to the reactionary rise of Sulla, who seized control of Rome in an unprecedented fashion. Violence had become a shocking new tool to resolve political dispute, showing the truly decaying nature of the government, and the dictatorship had been restored as perhaps the only means of initiating genuine reform (though Sulla's dictatorship was by no means benevolent). In one of history's remarkable bouts of irony, Sulla once commanded the young Caesar to divorce his first wife Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna. Caesar was astonishingly defiant, leading to him flee from exile and was saved only by the efforts of his mother and her friends, who pleaded with Sulla on his behalf. Sulla reluctantly relented, commenting that Caesar would one day be the end of Rome's "best" men (optimates), for in Caesar he saw much of Marius' ambition, an astute observation in hindsight.

Caesar (II)

Such was the world into which the young, ambitious Caesar was born and would prove invaluable to his political success. Tall, handsome, charming, sexually insatiable, and among the foremost orators of his generation, he embarked on a rather traditional career path for most of his life. After initial military service in the East (and a kidnapping by pirates that he eventually crucified in retribution), he oversaw financial affairs in Hispania (Spain) as quaestor. Possessing extraordinary vanity, he was said to have despaired upon seeing a statue of Alexander the Great, a man who had conquered much of the known world by thirty years old, in contrast to Caesar who had yet to enter prominence.

Caesar's situation began to change at the age of thirty-seven, when he was successfully elected Pontifex Maximus, the chief priesthood (religious stature played important roles in Roman politics). By this time, Caesar was outwardly populist in his political strategy; he acquired great debt for spending on public displays, restored trophies of Marius, and prosecuted men who had gained from Sulla's rule. Ever the opportunist, he acquired a taste for aligning himself with positions that made him stand out, even if it distanced him from the majority. At thirty nine, Caesar was appointed to govern southern Iberia for a year in which he tackled a widespread debt problem and enacted a swift military campaign against Spanish barbarians. Around this time, his personal debts caused him to seek financial assistance from one of the richest Romans in history, Marcus Licinius Crassus, a man who would quickly prove to be a valuable ally in the years to come.

After a year, Caesar concluded his successful governorship and was presented with a dilemma. His success in Iberia awarded him Rome's most prestigious military ceremony, the Roman triumph. Such an occasion was a tremendous honor for an aristocrat, but doing so at the time would have prevented him from finally running for consul. Caesar must have reasoned that a year of political inactivity would have ultimately proven detrimental (his debts was making him a prime target for persecution from his optimate enemies), for he chose to turn down the triumph in order to run for the consulship. Initially, Caesar was opposed by several members of the optimates who no doubt saw his populist nature as a threat to their stature, but in the end, he was victorious by a comfortable margin.

For a year, Caesar was now one of the two most powerful men in Rome, along with Marcus Bibulus. It was at this time that Caesar formed the famously-known "triumvirate" with Crassus and Pompey the Great, a man who was currently the most famous military commander in Rome and who had received an unprecedented three triumphs. Both men, along with Caesar, were currently of the populares faction, despite having animosity towards each other, and likely chose to side with the consul due to their reforms being continually blocked by a small faction of the optimates in the senate. Using Crassus' wealth, Pompey's popularity, and Caesar's current political power, the triumvirate was able to exert considerable influence in the Republic.

Once again, a land reform was made the center of legislation. Such a law would distribute land to many of Pompey's veterans and the urban poor and was once again popular with the citizenry. Despite anticipated opposition from the optimates, only a minor incident of violence occurred and the reform was eventually passed. Caesar successfully outmaneuvered his opponents for the rest of his consulship, passing a law that more closely regulated the behavior of governors, recognized the rule of Ptolemy XII in Egypt, and married his daughter Julia to Pompey in a final act of solidifying their friendship. By the end of his term, his conservative co-consul Bibulus was all but forgotten in the shadows of the triumvirate's success. At the end of Caesar's term, no doubt with Crassus' and Pompey's assistance, he was named proconsul, granting him governorship of three regions of Gaul (modern France), as well as the command of four legions. From this point onward, Caesar would experience success that would make him the most famous Roman in history.

To provide detail on Caesar's military campaigns in Gaul would be overwhelming, for it is the best period in which we have personal insight from a work known as the Commentaries, written by Caesar himself. His success against the Gaulish tribes allowed him to expand the territory of the Roman Republic (which would survive for centuries), brought Britain into the sphere of Roman influence, and earned him tremendous fame from the Roman people. To this day, Caesar is considered one of history's greatest military commanders and strategists (his Commentaries, for example, was studied and admired by Napoleon).

Gaul would consume eight years of Caesar's political life and by the end, the triumvirate was beginning to unravel. Crassus was killed in a foolish campaign against Parthia in an attempt to bolster his reputation and Pompey was named consul "without colleague" by the Senate. Slowly, Pompey's disposition towards Caesar had begun to sour, with little evidence to suggest that such a change was anything other than jealousy towards Caesar's rising prestige. Indeed, not only had Caesar conquered most of Gaul, his deals with the tribes had solidified the territories as stable provinces and new trade networks from plundered revenues helped the Roman economy flourish. Caesar had become a war hero and despite Pompey holding sole power in Rome, he was slowly falling under Caesar's shadow. Mounting political pressure from the senatorial optimates, who apparently saw Caesar as a greater political threat, forced Pompey to withdraw his support for his former colleague, particularly after Caesar's daughter Julia died from childbirth.

It is often believed, among the less educated, that the Roman civil war was caused by Caesar's desire to seize absolute control of Rome. As is often the case, the accusations against Caesar find themselves carrying the burden of proof, for there is nothing to suggest that he had such motives. Rather, his intention was to run for consul again upon his return to Rome and obtain legal protection from his enemies. Despite this, Caesar was ordered by the senate to relinquish control of his armies and return to Rome upon the expiration of his proconsular authority, where the Senate would undoubtedly attempt to persecute him under exaggerated charges. Caesar's fate appeared inescapable and after bitter negotiation and lack of compromise from the optimates, he gave up on legal recourse altogether and marched his fiercely loyal armies across the Rubicon river into Italy, an act of open rebellion. Once again, Rome was plunged into civil war, initiated by the petty senatorial elite seeking to protect their nobility.

The Senate was initially confident that Caesar would be crushed; they had all of Rome's resources at their disposal and Pompey was certainly a competent commander. However, it became quickly apparent that they had misjudged the situation. Caesar moved rapidly through Italy, gathering support from the local communities and pardoning those who rose against him, an act of astonishing generosity. The pace by which he moved towards Rome hampered the Senate's ability to mobilize sufficient legions and their support among the citizenry was shifting in favor of Caesar's cause. Additionally, Pompey refused to meet Caesar in person for negotiation, frustrating hopes for compromise. Realizing that Rome could not be properly defended, Pompey and the optimates abandoned the city.

Caesar had taken Rome and all of Italy virtually unopposed. Understandably, the people of Rome feared the same seizure of power in the manner of Sulla. Amazingly, Caesar took Rome without bloodshed, pardoned enemies, and addressed the people to assure them that his actions were solely out of dispute with the senatorial elite. Rome was taken, but the episodes of Sulla were never repeated. After securing the treasury funds, Caesar launched a quick offensive in Spain before returning to Rome again. Caesar was briefly appointed dictator in order to secure new elections and was made consul in 48 B.C, after which he resigned the dictatorship (eleven days in total).

Pompey, in his old age, appeared to have grown increasingly cowardly and reserved in his strategy throughout the Civil War. Indeed, much of Caesar's time would be spent chasing him across the East, at every point hoping to negotiate a truce and avoid bloodshed, despite Pompey refusing to cooperate. Pompey's cowardice would culminate in what should have been a decisive victory against Caesar at Dyrrhachium (modern Albania) where, despite utterly routing Caesar's army,  he did not pursue and allowed Caesar to regather his strength. Pompey's overconfidence would turn the tide against him at the Battle of Pharsalus, where a heavily outnumbered Caesar would miraculously destroy Pompey's largely inexperienced army. The optimates would never recover. Pompey fled to Egypt, but was decapitated by Ptolemy XIII in the hopes of winning Caesar's favor and the rest of his opponents scattered across the Mediterranean. The Republic, as they knew it, had ended.

Caesar pursued Pompey to Egypt, but was devastated to learn of his demise. He lost a former friend and the opportunity to pardon his greatest opponent. Indeed, Ptolemy made a fatal error in assassinating Pompey, for Egypt was in the midst of its own civil war between him and his older sister, Cleopatra. Caesar aligned himself with her cause (becoming her lover in the process) and ultimately succeeded in defeating Ptolemy's armies after a lengthy siege in Alexandria, placing Cleopatra as ruler. No doubt exhausted of war (and seemingly endless victory), Caesar took a lengthy vacation in Egypt with her, enjoying the hospitality of royalty and the ancient monarchy. An uprising in the East forced Caesar to leave Egypt and defeat Pharnaces II of Pontus, Rome's old enemy. A foolish offensive by the enemy allowed Caesar to destroy Pharnaces in an incredible five days time, after which he uttered his famous phrase "veni, vidi, vici" (I came, I saw, I conquered).

Caesar regrouped in Italy, where he was appointed dictator for a year in 48 B.C in order to oversee elections, appoint magistrates, and tackle (temporarily) Rome's enormous debt crisis. Placing Marc Antony in charge of Rome (a disastrous decision he later rescinded), he traveled to Africa where he destroyed a large army gathered by old Republican enemies. The invincible, but exhausted Caesar was finally able to crush the last remaining opposition in Spain during the years 46-45 B.C.

For three and a half years, civil war consumed the Roman republic, a state whose political machinery was already crumbling under external crises and the inability of the aristocracy to properly respond. With the addition of his campaigns in Gaul, Caesar had been constantly at war for over a decade and one may have suspected that upon returning to Rome as dictator, he'd seek to rest on his laurels, perhaps to the detriment of society. This was not to be the case. To the contrary, Caesar would be as busy as ever, undertaking an enormous administrative program to deal with long-standing problems facing the city and her provinces. He had not executed his opponents or initiated proscriptions, instead pardoning them and sought to establish new alliances. Caesar was not Sulla and never at any point in the war had he moved against his own people in the same manner. His power was absolute, but how he sought to wield it would be seen during the short time leading to his assassination, the Republic's reckoning.

Caesar (III)

We have now arrived at the most important time period for the purpose of this post, Caesar's dictatorship and assassination. Ironically, we have but a paucity of reliable information, as Caesar's Commentaries do not extend to his activities undertaken during his rule in Rome. Much of what was written about him during these last two years of his life were written by contemporaries critical of his rule and can not be considered objectively reliable. While hindsight allows one to judge Caesar's conspirators and their cause, it does little in evaluating the scope of his plans for Rome and the regime that he pursued. Nonetheless, enough has existed throughout history such that historians have considered him as: a political genius and revolutionary who sought monarchy as the means to restoring the failed state of Rome, a self-absorbed warmonger who eliminated the Republic's hope of saving itself and whose administration was scattered rather than far-sighted, or somewhere in between.

We are now tasked with the question of what Caesar really was. Was he a tyrant? An enlightened monarch? Merely a fortunate opportunist? I shall try to present my view as coherent as possible, though let us first grasp the overview of his agenda as dictator.

Victorious, Caesar arrived in Rome in 46 B.C and was appointed dictator for a period of ten years, this time to seriously reform the large-scale deficiencies plaguing the Republic (with the exception of putting down the uprising in Spain). Indeed, even before Caesar had initiated the Civil War, it was obvious that the functionality of the Senate had begun to collapse, in which self-interest replaced serious reform and violence became the common means by which disputes were settled. The wealth gap was staggering, leading to land loss amongst the peasantry and military veterans, such that huge numbers of the poor and homeless filled Rome's streets. The lack of a strong central government was severely straining the expanding territories. Above all, Rome's problems could not be adequately solved due to the concentration of power in the hands of a corrupt senatorial elite who did not wish to initiate any reform that threatened their wealth or position.

After celebrating an unprecedented four triumphs (on a scale never before seen), Caesar set out to address these problems using his supreme authority, finally without opposition. Temporarily, political stability in Rome had been achieved due to Caesar's considerable pardons towards his enemies. His powers as dictator allowed him to fill vacancies in the Senate, as well as creating 300 new senatorial positions, bringing the size to 900 (from 600 after Sulla). Not only were his appointments of Roman citizenry, he ordered a certain amount of positions filled by delegates from the provinces and other foreigners well-disposed towards Rome. While this undoubtedly angered the Senate nobility, such a measure was aimed at attempting to diversify the interests of the territories and further secure their loyalty, rather than solely within Italy.

To address the rampant homelessness and poor within the city, Caesar implemented an enormous colonization program, building upon his previous agrarian law as consul. He settled veterans and poor families on newly created colonies in Italy and the provinces, resettling 80,000 in total. He initiated a staggering series of public works projects that undoubtedly employed thousands, expanding the Forum and building several new temples and civic work buildings along the Tiber river and city outskirts. Indeed, he even pursued a construction project to alter the course of the Tiber itself, seeking to protect certain areas from flooding and opening up new farmland.

Rome, at the time of Caesar's ascension, was far from the glorious, marble capitol known in creative works displaying the period of the Roman Empire. It may have been growing, but it was filled with the destitute and showed no indication of it becoming a cultural and political center; Caesar's colonization and land programs were not enough to undo the dilapidation. He also initiated reforms aimed at strengthening the populace, not just removing the destitute from the streets. By taking a census of the city's population, he was able to halve the amount of grain allotted to the city, alleviating waste due to improper distribution. No doubt influenced by the cultural magnificence of Alexandria, Caesar offered immediate citizenship to scholars and doctors willing to work in Rome and ordered the construction of an enormous library aimed at collecting Greek and Latin literature.

Additionally, in what was one of Caesar's most lasting impressions upon the Western world, he ordered a reform of the calendar, beginning in 45 B.C. Before the Julian implementation, the Roman calendar operated on a lunar cycle. It was a horrendously inefficient system that ran months ahead of the actual seasons and was vulnerable to political manipulation. By reforming it to operate within the solar cycle, the Julian calendar extended to 365 days a year and is very accurate to the modern system that was only slightly reformed by Pope Gregory XIII. The month of July is named in his honor.

Caesar also sought to improve the debt crisis by ordering an immediate cancellation of 25% of public debt, to the delight of the citizenry, and outlawed currency hoarding. The tax system that allowed Roman intermediaries was abolished, allowing provinces more freedom in their collection processes and reducing corruption. He forbade citizens between the ages of 20-40 to leave Italy, unless on military assignment, and ordered that farms employ a third of its workforce with free people (as opposed to slaves), seeking to further reduce official unemployment. He also rewarded families for having children, in an effort to populate Italy.

How effective were these reforms and how did they play into Caesar's long term aims? His assassination forever robbed us of accurately determining the former, for despite the swift implementation of his laws as dictator, such policies only had a year's time of stability to take hold. The latter question plays into theories regarding Caesar's effectiveness as a ruler. There are those who contend that Caesar was merely an opportunist, whose military skill afforded him unprecedented power and whose enormous legislative agenda was scattered and done only to provide legitimacy to his dictatorship. While I believe this to be an unsatisfactory characterization, there may never be a decisive means to do so, considering Caesar's lack of personal writing as dictator. Nonetheless, I contend that Caesar was a largely benevolent ruler who saw autocracy as the only remedy to Rome's crumbling political machinery. In the process of defending such a characterization, an idea of his long term aims shall become clearer.

Was Caesar a tyrant? The word "tyrant" and "tyranny" are used in such a frustratingly ignorant manner that they appear to be synonymous with all forms of autocratic rule. A tyrant should be exclusive to autocratic rulers who use their power to solely advance their ambitions and satisfy personal desire. A tyrannical ruler is out of touch with his society and his people, militarily silencing their opinion and crushing opposition (see my post entitled "Kyklos: Part III"). Adding further frustration, the term "Caesarism" is more often associated with an authoritarian regime legitimized by violence than it is with the policies of Caesar himself.

This extreme opinion is far from accurate. It is true that militarism formed the basis of Caesar's seizure of power, as well as the fact that Roman legislation hardly operated outside of his dictatorial supervision. Militarism did not, however, provide the primary legitimacy to his regime. Caesar was unwillingly pressed into civil war by a jealous senatorial elite. He did not violently seize Rome, proscribe his enemies, or pillage Roman territory. Sulla, by contrast, was more of a tyrant than Caesar ever was and enforced the conservative will of the nobility, rather than the populist aims of the populares. The true definition of "Caesarism", in my opinion, only half coincides with the pejorative use, in that while it describes a charismatic ruler who militarily crushes opposition, it should also include the populist nature of Caesar's politics and whose leadership was more willing to solve political dispute through compromise and clemency, rather than force.

To also use the word "tyrant" would imply that Caesar had destroyed a government worth saving. For almost a century, the politics of the Republic had been undertaken through violent repression by an aristocracy against its own people. No serious scholar can contend that the Senate, by Caesar's time, represented a well-functioning government; democratic process was rare, at least for the larger and more popular bills and reforms. Overall, Caesar's dictatorship had virtually no opposition from the masses. He was generous to his people, sharing with each Roman citizen the spoils of his wars, and many of his larger reforms, in some way, benefited the common citizen. Only the optimates were vocal critics of his leadership and denounced his rule as the death of "liberty", though apparently their definition of liberty was exclusive to their circle. Even if the senators had a more educated understanding of freedom, their actions hardly suggested such.

This is not to say that Caesar was not guilty of safeguarding his authority. Instances such as his passing of laws that respectively limited the terms of proconsuls and propraetors (governors) to two-year and one-year terms come to mind, as well as his ability to reward supporters through political appointment. Almost certainly, his constitutional reforms suggest a consolidation of power and his acceptance of the many honors bestowed upon him cannot be separated from vanity. However, I believe that dual purposes to Caesar's actions were commonplace, and while he no doubt saw himself as worthy of being Rome's protector, it is important to also remember that there were few alternatives.

Let us, then, dispense with the notion of Caesar "the tyrant" and proceed. Was Caesar a monarch? I am far more willing to assent to this notion, the evidence being more compelling. Not long before his assassination, Caesar had been bestowed considerable honors by the Senate. Some of these may have been genuine, although they may have also been part of a strategy from his opponents, seeking to make his desire for kingship appear apparent to the people. A considerable amount of constitutional power came from the Senate, eventually removing all checks and balances on his authority. A special chair was made for him in the chambers, placed between the two consuls. Statues of him were erected in temples and carried to ceremonial games. At festivals, Caesar began to dress in traditionally royal garb (purple toga and tunic) and wore a laurel wreath that was eventually replaced with a gold one. Additionally, minted coins bore his face and laurel wreath. While it was not historically unusual for deceased Romans to be honored in coinage, Caesar was the first Roman who appeared during his lifetime.

In fact, it may be inescapable to say that Caesar was a monarch in all but the name. Some contend that such was his plan for most of his political career, but the burden of proof for such a claim is overwhelming. There is nothing to suggest that Caesar had imperial aims for most of his political career. In fact, had the optimates approved his attempts for compromise, the civil war would have never taken place and the power vacuum left after his victory would not have existed. It is far more probable that Caesar would have been satisfied with an additional consulship and partaking in a triumph or two near the end of his career, provided he enjoyed continued military success (a likely scenario).

However, Caesar may have experienced a turning point in his political outlook during his time in Egypt. His time with Cleopatra was surely favorable and under considerable royal hospitality. His  (alleged) son, Caesarion, that he fathered with the queen must have left some impression on him, as he had yet to do so with his legal wife Calpurnia. Considering the honors that Caesar accepted during his time as dictator, it seems likely that his view of a monarchy was favorable, despite "king" being a hated term since the last Etruscan king, Tarquin, nearly five hundred years before. This is, however, a speculative notion. Caesar, at least publicly, refused to be acknowledged as rex when called such by the people. An example of such was the infamous incident during the feast of Lupercalia, in which Marc Antony attempted to place a diadem upon Caesar's head, which he refused three times. Though his refusal was wildly cheered by the crowd, it did little to sway the minds of the opposing senators.

Whether or not Caesar actively sought monarchy of a royal nature upon his dictatorship remains debated, but it is indisputable that his rule became outwardly autocratic. A month before his assassination, he was named "dictator for life"and was mobilizing for a massive invasion of Parthia. By this time, resentment within the senatorial ranks had grown considerably, even among Caesar's closer associates. While Caesar was talented in many respects, his outward acceptance of the honors given to him by the senate and disregard for senators' involvement in traditional legislation proved to be a serious mistake, at least from the standpoint of political strategy. Even the clemency he had granted to his enemies had not sufficiently rendered them his allies or at least politically indifferent. The honors and prestige granted to Caesar had begun to border on divinity, adding to the jealousy felt among the senators. To them, Caesar had robbed them of prestige and fame, despite his dictatorship being essential to quickly putting into practice his ambitious reforms. Blinded by resentment, a serious conspiracy began to form in 44 B.C, which the senators felt had to be done quickly before Caesar left for his Parthian campaign in April. Otherwise, he would have been away while still retaining his authority and had he succeeded against Parthia (considering his history, odds were favorable), this would have only added legitimacy to his rule.

On March 15th, 44 B.C, Caesar met with the Senate for the final time before his Parthian campaign. Despite warnings from his associates concerning the plot, particularly from Marc Antony, Caesar had underestimated the situation and proceeded. The conspirators were led by Gaius Cassius Longinus and Marcus Junius Brutus, the son of one of Caesar's lovers, Servillia. Brutus had originally surrendered to Caesar during the civil war and was instantly pardoned. Nonetheless, he decided to throw in his lot with the optimates and gave symbolic legitimacy to the plot, as his ancestor was involved in the expulsion of the last Roman king. They decided to stab Caesar in the Senate chamber in an act of "liberty" hoping to restore the Republic to its conservative, aristocratic fashion.

As Caesar entered the chamber, several of the senators stalled Marc Antony outside. A senator by the name of Lucius Tillius Cimber asked Caesar to recall his Pompeian brother from exile, to which he calmly refused. Slowly, the conspirators surrounded Caesar and after some initial hesitation, began to stab him repeatedly. After a brief resistance, he succumbed to his wounds and fell to the floor; he was ultimately stabbed twenty three times. Despite the well-known description by Shakespeare in which Caesar utters "et tu, Brute?", there is more reason to believe that Caesar simply said nothing and pulled his toga over his head in a final act of vanity. The most powerful Roman in history had fallen.

The aftermath of Caesar's assassination places tremendous burden of proof upon those supportive of the conspirators. While the optimates believed that they had acted out in liberty and were confident in restoring the Republic, reality showed that they were, in fact, nothing more than petty, political illiterates. Upon Caesar's death, most senators fled the chamber and the conspirators found themselves alone in Rome's empty streets. The masses who benefited from Caesar's populist rule were at first ambivalent, perhaps out of shock. However, the conspirators who hoped to seize power had no political agenda in mind upon Caesar's assassination. Indeed, the enormous change brought about by his legislation as dictator proved beyond the optimates' abilities to deal with and ultimately, a deal was bartered with Marc Antony, who they failed to kill, in which most of Caesar's legislation remained. Keeping Antony alive proved to be a serious mistake, for he succeeded in turning the mob against the conspirators during Caesar's funeral, eventually forcing them into exile out of fear for their safety.

Due to Caesar having never had a legal son, his great-nephew Octavian was named heir to his name and vast fortune, catapulting him to prestige. The immense power vacuum created by the assassination once again cast Rome into another civil war, in which Octavian and Antony joined forces against the optimates. Unlike Caesar, they returned to Sulla's method of proscription and executed dozens of opponents in Rome before ultimately crushing the opposing forces at the battle of Philippi. Not even that brought stability, for Octavian and Antony became embroiled in a power struggle upon which Octavian would be victorious. The Roman Republic would never be resurrected. Octavian succeeded in continuing the autocratic policies of Caesar in what could only be described as political genius. He became Augustus, Rome's first emperor, and transformed the Republic into the Roman Empire, the next great phase of Western civilization.

Before his assassination, Caesar prophetically stated that the loss of his rule would result in another civil war for Rome. The aims of his legislation had been largely aimed at establishing Rome as an effective, centralized capitol, while establishing cohesion amongst the provinces. In some ways, the Roman Republic was always bound for the transition towards empire; imperialism was, historically, an important element of Roman society since its humble beginnings and the breakdown of the Republic demanded more centralized control to deal with its expansion. This continued to be frustrated by the corruption and ineffectiveness due to aristocratic domination, making the rise of a man like Caesar almost inevitable. Autocracy promised to bring what democracy had failed to provide its people: prosperity, or in the least, stability. Whether or not the optimates could accept such change was irrelevant. History had vindicated Caesar.

Caesar may have been a monarch at heart, but he was no tyrant. Though ambitious and vain, there is little reason to doubt his devotion to his people and to Rome. His military genius in Gaul had already made him historically immortal and had his associates held back their pride, he may have very well just ended with a solid political career. Emerging from the civil war, Caesar understood the failures of the Senate and sought to show the world that autocracy was the only way to achieve stability. While lacking the political genius of his great-nephew Augustus, who was undoubtedly influenced by the assassination, Caesar nonetheless represented all that was transforming within Roman society and, indeed, the world. Few have left such an impact upon Western history.

It has been a privilege to provide my insight on his life and historical influence. I thank readers for their attention and hope that Caesar remains in the minds and hearts of our generation, particularly during a time where we are personally seeing democracy challenged by modern society.

Hail Caesar.